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NOW v. SCHEIDLER ROUND TWO
Craig M. Bradley*
In 1994, the Supreme Court decided National Organization of Wo-
men v. Scheidler.' The case arose from a civil RICO suit filed by
N.O.W. and several abortion clinics against a coalition of anti-abortion
groups (known as the Pro-Life Action Network or PLAN) led by
Joeseph Scheidler. Plaintiffs asserted that PLAN had used a pattern of
racketeering activity to cause abortion clinics to shut down. The com-
plaint loosely alleged numerous criminal acts by the defendants, but the
only crimes advanced as the basis for the RICO claim were extortion,
and conspiracy to commit extortion. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted that
defendants had conspired to use threatened or actual force, violence or
fear to induce clinic employees, doctors and patients to forego treatment,
give up their jobs, etc., in violation of the Hobbs Act and state laws
forbidding extortion. 2
The case was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that
political action groups who did not seek economic benefit from their
activities could not be a proper subject of a RICO case. 3 The Seventh
Circuit affirmed. 4
The Supreme Court reversed the courts below and unanimously
held that Congress has not, either in the definition section or in the oper-
ative language, required that an enterprise in 1962(c) have an economic
motive.5 As the Court noted, the enterprises to which the RICO statute
applies could have been limited by Congress to individuals or groups
that had an economic motive, but was not.6 Rather, as 1961(4) declares,
enterprise includes any "individual . . .or group of individuals." The
Court further observed that, while the statute may have had organized
* The author is the James L. Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University School of
Law, Bloomington, IN. The author would like to thank Professor Patrick Baude for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft. This paper was presented at a panel of the Association of American
Law Schools "RICO Thirty Years Later: A Comparative Perspective," held on January 7, 2000.
1. N.O.W. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
2. Id at 253. Thus, in terms of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §1962 (c) (1988 & Supp. 1 1989) they alleged that defendants had operated their anti-
abortion enterprise through a pattern of extortionate activities. They also alleged a conspiracy to
do this under §18 U.S.C. 1962 (d). Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX, Pub. L. No.
91-452, 84 Stat. 9222 (codified as amended as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988 & Supp. I 1989))[hereinafter RICO].
3. National Organization of Women v. Scheidler, 765 F. Supp. 937, 943 (N.D. II., 1991)
4. National Organization of Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992).
5. 510 U.S. at 261.
6. Id. at 260-61.
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crime as its focus, (it) was not limited in its application to organized
crime,7 contrary to the view of the Seventh Circuit. Finally, the Court
noted that it is not necessary to be a profit-seeking organization in order
to affect interstate commerce under the statute. 8
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, concurred, but expressed
some concern about possible First Amendment problems in prosecuting
or suing a political advocacy group under RICO. As he pointed out, in
agreeing with the Court's decision, "an economic-motive requirement
would prove too much with respect to First Amendment interests, since
it would keep RICO from reaching ideological entities whose members
commit acts of violence we need not fear chilling."9 However, he
stressed that "nothing in the Court's opinion precludes a RICO defen-
dant from raising the First Amendment in its defense in a particular
case."10
Following the Court's reinstatement of NOW's lawsuit, I published
an article in the Supreme Court Review agreeing with the Court's RICO
analysis, but pointing out what I considered to be some serious problems
with the plaintiffs' case,' concerning both whether the plaintiffs had
adequately alleged a RICO violation and whether their cause of action
violated the First Amendment. I concluded that their complaint, as writ-
ten, did not adequately set forth a pattern of extortionate conduct
amounting to a RICO violation and that their lawsuit, as filed, would
intrude on the defendants' First Amendment rights. However, I further
concluded that they might well be able to make out a case that did vio-
late RICO and did not violate the First Amendment if they could allege
and prove extortion as that term is generally understood. Meanwhile,
the plaintiffs pursued their case in the District Court in Illinois, and, on
April 14, 1998, a jury returned a verdict for plaintiffs in the amount of
approximately $86,000. The jury concluded that the defendants had
committed 21 acts of extortion in violation of federal law, 25 acts of
extortion under (unspecified) state laws and 4 acts or threats of violence
to any people or property. 12 Plaintiffs are seeking to have these damages
trebled, as RICO provides, and are also demanding costs and counsel
fees to be paid by defendants.
7. Id. (quoting H. J., Inc. v. Nothwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989)).
8. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 259.
9. Id. at. 263-64.
10. Id. at 264 (citing NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 917 (1982)).
11. Craig Bradley, NOW v. Scheidler: RICO Meets the First Amendment, 1994 SuP. COURT
Rav 129 (1995).
12. Special Interrogatories and Verdict Form, at 49-51, N.O.W. v. Scheidler, Nos. 99-3076,
99-3336, 99-3891, 99-3892 (appeal pending in 7' Cir.) (unpublished document on file with the
author).
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NOW's pleadings and proof are not substantially different from the
original complaint that had been the subject of the Supreme Court deci-
sion. Consequently, this case should be reversed on appeal because
plaintiffs have not established that the crime of extortion was committed
and because their RICO suit, as proved, violated the First Amendment. ' 3
Defendants are members of an unpopular political advocacy group.
While their general anti-abortion position is shared by many Americans,
the tactics that they employ-blockading clinics, harassing patients and
staff, etc.- are widely condemned. Nor are these defendants necessa-
rily innocent of all criminal activity. There is ample evidence in the re-
cord in this case suggesting violations of state trespassing, and perhaps
other laws and the Federal Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) statute,
18 U.S.C. §248 (a),' 4 as well as evidence of a few acts and threats of
violence.' 5 Certainly no one has the right to forcibly block access to
clinics or to threaten staff or patients with violence.
However, violation of these statutes does not constitute a violation
of RICO because neither FACE, trespassing, nor acts or threats of vio-
lence are among the listed predicate crimes necessary to constitute a
RICO violation.' 6 Indeed, the reason that the FACE statute was de-
manded by pro-choice advocates was because existing federal and state
laws (including, presumably, RICO and extortion) were inadequate.' 7
And, although plaintiffs' complaint makes references to such crimes as
murder, arson and kidnapping committed by certain anti-abortion zeal-
ots, there was no proof of any such crimes having been committed by
13. Although I disagree with appellant's anti-choice position, I filed an amicus brief on their
behalf because of my belief that their acts did not violate RICO and that the lawsuit infringed on
their First Amendment rights. Unfortunately, counsel for defendants did not file this brief on
time, and it was rejected by the court as untimely.
14. Under the Federal Access to Clinic Entrances Act [FACE], 18 U.S.C. §248 (a) (1999),
an individual may be subject to civil or criminal penalties if he:
(1) by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates,
or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person because that
person is or has been , or in order to intimidate such person or any other person or any
class of persons from, obtaining or providing reproductive health services;...
(3) intentionally damages or destroys the property of a facility, or attempts to do so, be-
cause such facility provides reproductive health services...."
15. Verdict Form at 49, supra note 12 (The jury found four (unspecified) acts or threats of
physical violence by defendants.).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 setting forth a lengthy list of RICO predicate crimes.
17. Attorney General Reno testified that "existing Federal laws, while perhaps applicable in
some instances, (are) inadequate." Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess., May 12, 1993 at 8. Likewise, Rep. Charles Schumer, Chairman
of the House Subcommittee considering the Bill opined that "[tihe state laws are inadequate to
deal with the problem." Hearings Before the House Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice
of the Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 1 and June 10, 1993, at 2.
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the defendants in this case, and these claims were summarily dis-
missed.' 8 Accordingly, the jury's RICO verdict against defendants was
based entirely on violations of the Hobbs Act, under federal law, and
extortion under state law.' 9 However, just what acts or threats the jury
might have been referring to in this verdict are not specified.
Even more fundamentally, the judgement against these defendants
under RICO, and especially the imposition of treble damages, violates
the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court made clear in NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware.20 Reservations about subjecting such defendants
to civil RICO were expressed by Justice Souter, concurring in NOW v.
Scheidler.2' He noted that "[c]onduct alleged to be Hobbs Act extortion
may turn out to be fully protected First Amendment activity. . And
even in a case where a RICO violation has been validly established, the
First Amendment may limit the relief that can be granted against an
organization otherwise engaged in protected expression."2 2 There fol-
lows a discussion of why RICO is inappropriate in this case.
I. TREBLE DAMAGES AND COUNSEL FEES MAY NOT BE LEVIED
AGAINST A POLITICAL ADVOCACY ORGANIZATION.
Claiborne holds that when political protest, which this unquestiona-
bly is, is subjected to a damage suit, damages must be limited to the
"direct consequences of (violent) conduct" and "may not be award[ed]
.. for the consequences of nonviolent protected activity." 23 Thus, even
if the plaintiffs established that their clients suffered financial injury in
the amounts found in the jury verdict, they would have to establish that
these were all due to those limited aspects of the defendants' behavior
that were violent. Even conduct that is illegal, such as trespassing and
interfering with access to clinics through non-violent behavior, may not,
under Claiborne be subject to damages. Nor, of course, may the legiti-
mate aspects of defendants' behavior. (One issue that remains unclear
after Claiborne is what exactly does violence mean? There may be some
degree of jostling or shoving that is part of sit-in type protests that oc-
curred at some clinics that is still protected expression.) Treble damages
18. Judge Coar's Order of Sept. 19, 1997 at 40 (Unpublished Memorandum Opinion and
Order, on file with the author).
19. See Special Interrogatories and Verdict form, supra note 12 (finding 25 violations of
state extortion laws and 21 violations of federal extortion law. The form does not specify whether
any of these extortion crimes were related to the four acts or threats of violence also found by the
jury).
20. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 US 886 (1982).
21. Scheidler, 510 US at 263.
22. Id. at 264.
23. Claiborne, 458 US at 918 (emphasis added).
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and counsel fees under RICO, even if RICO is applicable, are clearly not
allowed. RICO was designed to destroy the organizations to which it
was applied, in part through the use of the treble damage remedy. 24
Such destruction is inappropriate as to a First Amendment protest organ-
ization. Damages limited to direct consequence of violent conduct do
not include treble, or other punitive, damages, costs or counsel fees.
II. THE DAMAGES IN THIS CASE WERE NOT LIMITED TO LOSSES
PROXIMATELY CAUSED By UNLAWFUL CONDUCT.
It seems clear, based on both the majority and concurring opinions
in NOW v. Scheidler, as well as Claiborne Hardware, that a political
advocacy group that engages in acts of violence may be subjected to
both prosecution and civil suit under RICO, (but not treble damages).
For example, as Justice Souter noted, "we need not fear chilling ideolog-
ical groups whose members commit acts of violence. '' 25 However, in
Claiborne Hardware, which involved a mostly non-violent boycott of
white merchants by the NAACP but which also involved some acts and
threats of violence, the Court addressed itself to advocacy groups that
may commits such acts:
No federal rule of law restricts a State from imposing tort liability for
business losses that are caused by violence or threats of violence. When
such conduct occurs in the context of constitutionally protected activity,
however, precision of regulation is demanded 26 ...Only those losses
proximately caused by unlawful conduct may be recovered. 27
[Furthermore] the First Amendment similarly restricts the ability of the
State to impose liability on an individual solely because of his associa-
tion with another... [B]lanket prohibition of association with a group
having both legal and illegal aims would present a real danger that legit-
imate political expression or association would be impaired ...To pun-
ish association with such a group there must be clear proof that a
defendant specifically intends to accomplish the aims of the organiza-
tion by resorting to violence... This intent must be judged according to
strictest law, for otherwise there is a danger that one in sympathy with
the legitimate aims of such a group, but not specifically intending to
24. Hearings on Measures Relating to Organized Crime Before the Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures of the Sen. Comm. of the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 449 (1969)
(President's message on Organized Crime) ("The arrest, conviction, and imprisonment of a Mafia
lieutenant can curtail operations, but does not put the syndicate out of business. As long as the
property of organized crime remains, new leaders will step forward to take the place of those in
jail."). See generally Craig Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO,
65 IOWA L.R. 837 (1980) for an early, and relatively succinct, analysis of RICO's provisions.
25. Scheidler, 510 U.S. at 264.
26. Claiborne Hardware, 458 US at 916.
27. Id. at 918.
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accomplish them by resort to violence, might be punished for his adher-
ence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes ...28
Yet, at this trial, as Judge Coar found in his opinion following the
verdict, the jury did not state which defendants did these acts or when
they occurred, only the total number of acts. 29 Indeed, he refused to
require any specificity of proof despite the objection of the defense at-
torney that such specificity was necessary to adequately defend this
case. 30 In order to hold members of an advocacy group responsible for
acts of violence the evidence must show which defendant did what at
what time. It is not enough to show that there were violent acts commit-
ted by anti-abortion protestors, as cited by Judge Coar,3' without tying
them to particular acts of these defendants. 32 This violates the precision
of regulation required by Claiborne, set forth above. Indeed, many of
the acts cited by the plaintiffs in their complaint were not committed by
any of the named defendants, or by people who were associated with
their organizations.
III. NONE OF THE ACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT CONSTITUTE
VIOLATIONS OF THE HOBBS ACT, OR EXTORTION UNDER STATE LAW
AND THE JURY VERDICT WAS INADEQUATE AS TO THESE CRIMES.
A. The jury verdict is based on violations of the Hobbs Act 33 and
extortion under state law both of which are pattern crimes
under RICO.
However, as the Hobbs Act provides, and as is the case with most
28. Id. at 918-919.
29. Judge Coar's Order of July 16, 1999 at 18 (unpublished Memorandum Opinion and
Order, on file with the author).
30. Counsel for Defendants: "Your honor... we urge that the plaintiff should list in the
special interrogatories each particular incident they allege to constitute an act of force, threat or
violence sufficient to be extortion." The Court: "Absolutely not." Trial Translation at 4495 (on
file with the author).
31. Judge Coar's Order of July 16, 1999, supra note 29, at 2-3.
32. The burden of demonstrating that (the taint of violence) which colored some acts,
colored the entire effort... is not satisfied by evidence that violence occurred or even that violence
contributed to the success of the boycott. A massive and prolonged effort to change the social,
political, and economic structure of a local environment cannot be characterized as a violent con-
spiracy simply by reference to the ephemeral consequences of relatively few violent acts." Clai-
borne, 458 U.S. at 933.
33. The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §1951 (1994), provides in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever, in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the
movement of any article or commodity in commerce by robbery or extortion or attempts or
conspires so to do, or commits physical violence to any person or property in furtherance
of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined, etc.
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state extortion laws, 34 an element of that crime is obtaining property.
Yet in his instructions to the jury the judge specifically informed the
jury that they could ignore this element: "[P]laintiffs must show that
defendants. . .cause[d]. . .(various plaintiffs) to give up a property
right. . . It does not matter whether or not the extortion provided an
economic benefit to PLAN." 35 Thus, though the RICO concept of "en-
terprise" is not limited to those organizations that have an economic
goal, as the Supreme Court held in this case, the crime of extortion does
require, as the Hobbs Act states, that the defendant seek to "obtain
property."
The crime of extortion, as exemplified by the Hobbs Act, is not
committed by forcing someone to do something against their will. That
is the crime of criminal coercion, which is not included among the pat-
tern crimes of RICO. While the obtainment of intangible property can
certainly satisfy the "obtaining property" element of the Hobbs Act,36 it
was an unjustified reading of that statute by the trial judge in this case
to conclude that the element of obtaining property did not in fact require
that the defendant actually obtain any property, but merely caused the
plaintiff to forego a property right:
The Hobbs Act was drawn from New York's Field Code. Under that
code it was well-settled that extortion required an unlawful taking. As
the New York cases cited by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Enmons make clear, an accused could not be guilty of extortion unless
he was actuated by the purpose of obtaining a financial benefit for
himself...."37
It is true, that in a few states, extortion is not limited to "obtaining
property" but may include "criminal coercion" as well. 38 However,
since the jury did not specify which conduct constituted extortion under
state law, much less what state this conduct occurred in, we have no way
of knowing whether the extortion found by the jury occurred in those
(b)(2) The term extortion means the obtaining of property [emphasis added] from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear,
or under color of official right.
34. It was not specified by the jury which state's extortion laws had been violated by the
defendants.
35. Trial Transcript, supra note 31, at 4595 (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) holding that this will satisfy the
implied property element obtainment in the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. §1341.
37. Bradley, supra note 11, at 140 (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 406 n.16
(1973)).
38. According to WAYNE R. LAFAVE AND AUSTIN W. SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
460 (1986) the only such states are Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Ohio, and Wyoming,
though some other states may simply call extortion "criminal coercion." See also Bradley, supra
note 11, at 144 n.82.
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few states that do not limit extortion to obtainment of property by the
defendant.
Furthermore, many of the threats issued by defendants were threats
of demonstrations or harassment, not of violence, and thus cannot be the
basis of a charge of extortion against a political advocacy organization.
B. In Richardson v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute (CCE).39
CCE is an "enterprise" statute, similar to, and contemporaneous
with RICO. It forbids any person from engaging in a continuing crimi-
nal enterprise involving a series of violations of drug statutes.40 To find
a violation of this statute, the Court held: "a jury. . .must unanimously
agree, not only that the defendant committed some continuing series of
violations but also that the defendant committed each of the individual
violations necessary to make up that continuing series." 41
Likewise, RICO requires proof of a "pattern of racketeering activi-
ties." Thus, applying Richardson, the jury verdict must specify precisely
which of the many acts mentioned at the trial were the predicate acts of
extortion that constituted the RICO pattern.42 But the charge to the jury
required no such proof.43 Indeed, as noted above, the judge, over de-
fense objection, flatly refused to require such a finding by the jury. Nor
did the jury verdict specify which of the various acts of extortion that
they found constituted the "pattern." 44 This is particularly crucial under
RICO because, without knowing what conduct constituted the "21 acts
of extortion under federal law" and "25 acts under state law" found by
the jury, it is impossible to tell whether these crimes constituted the nec-
essary "pattern," whether the enterprise was conducted "through" those
crimes or even which defendant committed, and which "enterprise" was
conducted, through all these crimes.
When the acts in question are part of a political protest, this defect
is even more acute, as Claiborne Hardware makes clear. The jury's
finding of 21 acts of extortion under federal and 25 under state law must
be specific. That is, the verdict must state which defendant committed
which extortionate threat or act of violence. The failure to be specific
shows that the jury, like the complaint, did not carefully consider which
acts were committed by these defendants and which acts may have been
39. Richardson v. United States, 119 S.Ct. 1707 (1999).
40. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) and (c) (1999).
41. Richardson, 119 S.Ct. at 1709.
42. Trial Transcript, supra note 31, at 4943-44.
43. Trial Transcript, supra note 31, at 4943-48.
44. Special Interrogatories and Verdict Form, supra note 12.
[Vol. 27:233
NOW v. Scheidler Round Two
committed by other pro-life activists. (The complaint is full of refer-
ences to acts committed by anti-abortion activist who were not parties to
the lawsuit). Nor, it appears, did the jury separate acts and threats of
violence, for which damages may be awarded, from acts or threats of
barricading and political demonstration, for which damages are inappro-
priate. There simply are not 25 acts that are even arguably "extortionate
threats" nor 21 acts that are arguably Hobbs Act violations, proved in
this case. Had such lawsuits been allowed to succeed in the 1960's, they
would have shut down the Civil Rights Movement.
C. The amended complaint does adopt the suggestion in my article
that the Hobbs Act may be proved in a different way than through an
allegation of either "robbery" or "extortion. "45
The Hobbs Act contains an additional passage that has gone unno-
ticed. In addition to forbidding interference with commerce by robbery
or extortion, it further criminalizes one who "commits or threatens phys-
ical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or pur-
pose to do anything in violation of this section. '46 This can be read as
covering interference with commerce by threats or violence whether or
not property is obtained, such as terrorists blowing up bridges. This is
consistent with Congress' apparent purpose to use the Hobbs Act as a
means of deterring and punishing wartime sabotage that did not involve
either robbery or extortion. Thus, although "extortion" requires obtain-
ment of property, this long unnoticed passage in the Hobbs Act does not.
However, this reading of the Hobbs Act, while it could be the basis
of a suit such as this one, has not been satisfied by the plaintiffs in this
case. The complaint makes no effort to distinguish between such illegal
threats and the constitutionally protected protest activities that were ad-
mittedly designed to close down or interfere with these clinics. Thus,
Scheidler's threat of "reprisals"(on page 46 of the complaint) is far too
vague to suffice. No effort is made in the complaint to tie the acts speci-
fied there to any specific interference with commerce. We have no idea
whether the jury based its findings of "extortion" on illegal threats of
violence or protected threats of demonstrations and picketing.
Moreover, the mere use of the telephone or traveling interstate is
not enough of a connection to commerce to qualify under this suggested
45. Bradley, supra note 11, at 142-44. See Third Amended Complaint at 2 (unpublished
transcript on file with the author.)
46. 18 U.S.C. §1951 (1994). The purposes of this bill are "(1) to prevent interference with
interstate commerce by robbery or extortion, as defined in the bill, and (2) to prevent interference
with the transportation of troops, munitions, war supplies, or mail in interstate or foreign com-
merce." HR No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 1945) at 1. (submitted by Cong. Hobbs).
2000]
Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com.
approach to the Hobbs Act. The protected party in robbery and extor-
tion is the victim of the robbery or extortion. Therefore, it is sufficient
under the Act that the defendant's behavior only "affect commerce." On
the other hand, the "victim" under my approach is commerce itself.
Thus, if a person is charged, not with obtaining property through rob-
bery or extortion, but with "committing or threatening physical violence
to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do any-
thing in violation of this section," that must be, as Congress clearly in-
tended, a plan or purpose to damage commerce (eg. by blowing up
bridges). Mere incidental "effect" on the facilities of interstate com-
merce, though enough to make out a Hobbs Act violation under the rob-
bery and extortion provisions of the Hobbs Act, is not such a plan or
purpose in violation of this provision. But the judge's instructions47 do
not require the jury to find any such interference. If illegal threats were
employed, however, driving abortion clinics out of business would cer-
tainly be a sufficient effect on commerce.
In conclusion, plaintiffs have made out violations of the FACE stat-
ute and state trespassing laws, and enforcement of these laws should be
adequate to allow abortion clinics to operate effectively. It is not neces-
sary to invoke the stringent provisions of RICO, which were designed to
put criminal enterprises out of business, against anti-abortion protesters.
In order to do so, plaintiffs would have to show that a particular anti-
abortion "enterprise" was operated through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivities, in this case extortion. But plaintiffs have failed to do this. They
have not proved that extortion, as opposed to criminal coercion, oc-
curred in that they have shown no obtainment of property. Nor have
they shown that defendants sought to damage commerce under my alter-
native reading of the Hobbs Act. They have not attributed particular
acts or threats of violence to particular defendants, nor have they shown
a "pattern" as required by RICO. Finally, applying RICO to this case,
without attributing damages to specific acts or threats of violence by
named defendants, violates the First Amendment, as will the imposition
of treble damages and counsel fees. Just because, plaintiffs cause may
be just, does not mean that they can ignore the strictures of the First
Amendment in advancing it.
47. Trial Transcript, supra note 31, at 4943-4842.
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